Global Digital
While it is unclear at this stage what exactly a second Trump administration means for U.S. digital, technology, and trade policy, one thing that is clear is that it will involve major changes, especially as it relates to the potential for high, broad tariffs. Media reports and commentary and recent personnel appointments give some early clues on what else a second Trump administration may do. It is an open question as to which Biden administration policies a second Trump administration keeps, revises, or scraps (like Biden administration executive orders on artificial intelligence) and which policies and strategies from the first Trump administration it revives or revises. It is also unclear the extent to which a second Trump administration will consider the interests of allies and close trading partners and whether the Trump administration will pursue its own vision for global technology governance at the G7 and other fora.
There are several international and domestic geopolitical and economic forces shaping digital, technology, and trade policy priorities of the incoming administration. Below is a summary of developments since November 05 shaping the outlook for critical digital policy issues under a second Trump administration.
KEY TECH POLICY PERSONNEL
Gail Slater, economic policy advisor to Vice President-elect JD Vance, and Michael Kratsios, chief technology officer under the first Trump administration, are reportedly handling tech policy during the Trump transition. Kratsios was one of the authors of President-elect Trump’s 2020 artificial intelligence (AI) executive order (EO) and has more recently worked on AI in the private sector. While Slater previously held top executive roles in the private sector and the now-defunct tech industry trade group The Internet Association. Slater also worked for the Trump 1.0 administration as a special assistant to the president on tech, telecom, and cybersecurity issues.
TARIFFS, U.S. TRADE POLICY, AND SUPPLY CHAINS
President-elect Trump has proposed a 60% tariff on goods from China and a tariff of up to 20% on everything else the U.S. imports. It is unclear how broadly, selectively, or punitively the tariffs will be used. As per media reports, he is considering Robert Lighthizer to return as a ‘trade czar’ with oversight of trade policy across the administration, including at the Commerce Department and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).
President-elect Trump and the Republican Party Platform have expressed plans to revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status, which have some bipartisan support. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party’s (Select Committee on the CCP’s) annual report recommends that the United States revoke China’s PNTR status if Congress determines that China has failed to meet its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. On November 14, 2024, Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) of the Select Committee on the CCP introduced the Restoring Trade Fairness Act, a bill that would revoke China’s PNTR.
Conceptually, president-elect Trump’s plans to enact tariffs on China (but also potentially, U.S. allies) raises the prospect for the administration to use tariffs to encourage supply chain diversification away from China to other U.S. trading partners. It is unclear how targeted and discerning the second Trump administration will be on tariffs, given the first Trump administration often targeted U.S. allies in enacting tariffs on steel, aluminum, and other products.
Outlook for Multilateralism
A second Trump administration is likely to do away with or significantly revise and repackage the Biden administration’s key multilateral trade initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which was renegotiated under the first Trump administration, is set to be reviewed in 2026, which presents another opportunity for changes. Overall, the Trump administration’s posture towards multilateralism is to remain unchanged and is set to be (again) more bilateral and transactional.
U.S. DIGITAL TRADE POLICY
The Biden administration essentially withdrew from digital trade policy making in the Asia-Pacific and globally. The first Trump administration, under USTR Lighthizer, recognized the role and value of digital trade. It was willing to use bilateral tools to punish trade patterns unfavorable to the U.S., incentivize preferred digital trade policies, and pursue digital trade provisions in trade agreements, such as in USMCA and the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement.
For example, USTR Lighthizer withdrew or threatened to withdraw Indonesia, India, and other countries’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) tariff-free access to the U.S. market due to digital trade barriers. There is an opportunity with the new Trump administration to reset U.S. digital trade policy and pursue offensive interests as part of bilateral trade negotiations. Furthermore, given the Trump administration’s focus on getting firms to shift out of China, there is potential to use new trade agreements to encourage trade to and investment in trusted/friendly partners.
INTERNET STRATEGY: DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY, DIGITAL SOLIDARITY, AND DIGITAL REALPOLITIK
Earlier in 2024, the Biden administration State Department released its International Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategy, with its focus on “digital solidarity.” It recognized that all who use digital technologies in a rights-respecting manner are more secure, resilient, self-determining, and prosperous when they work together to shape the international environment and innovate at the technological edge. This does not seem aligned with a new Trump administration, given what it did the first time around.
The first Trump administration’s Cybersecurity Strategy was the closest to a formal strategy for the global internet with its goal to “preserve the long-term openness, interoperability, security, and reliability of the Internet, which supports and is reinforced by America’s interests. We will take specific global efforts to promote these objectives, while supporting market growth for infrastructure and emerging technologies and building cyber capacity internationally.” A future Trump administration may go one step further in adopting a strategy of “digital realpolitik,” which would more ruthlessly and proactively prioritize U.S. interests by spreading the U.S. digital innovation policy system and constraining digital adversaries, especially China.
Recent public reporting on the Biden administration’s anticipated second executive order on cybersecurity states the document is 95% of the way to its final incarnation. The target for the current administration is reportedly to have it signed in early December. There is precedent for this tight timeline, as the Trump administration finished up a cybersecurity-related executive order deep into January of the former president’s prior term.
President-elect Trump has not named a director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which leads civilian government cybersecurity efforts. But the overall focus for cybersecurity is expected to be skewed less towards regulations and more towards protecting critical infrastructure and technology companies. The GOP platform hosted on the Trump for President site already prioritizes the safety of critical infrastructure and the industrial base against cyber threats. But that remains the only mention of cyber in the entire document. Meanwhile, speculation continues to swirl around whether president-elect Trump will narrow the mission of the agency he stood up under his first term to one more focused on the aforementioned initiatives and far less so on disinformation and content moderation.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Approach to AI Policy and Legislative Framework
A second Trump administration is likely to support a lighter regulatory touch on AI and other emerging technologies. President-elect Trump had issued his own executive order on AI in 2020 and committed to rescinding President Biden’s executive order on AI in December 2023. Vice President-elect JD Vance has stated he’s worried that efforts to enact AI regulation are a form of regulatory capture, and that he supports open-source AI. The Republican National Committee’s policy platform reinforced this position, describing the order as “dangerous” and “[imposing] Radical Leftwing ideas on the development of this technology”. Therefore, the first major AI policy move will likely be to repeal or amend the Biden administration’s EO on AI. There are also reports of a replacement EO with more military-focused development of AI applications and industry-led agencies for model evaluation and security.
Overall, apart from non-alignment on issues such as equity and bias concerns, there is rare bipartisan interest in supporting the U.S.’ leading role in AI. This is in part due to its significant national security implications and its increasing critical role in U.S. competitiveness and innovation. The incoming administration will likely view AI primarily through this competition lens; efforts at development will be accelerated for defense against China. This time around the President-elect’s tech industry supporters are willing to work closely with the government on national security issues to counter China.
Chip export restrictions are likely to remain a key lever in U.S. AI policy. President-elect Trump may well strengthen controls that curb China’s access to advanced semiconductors. The administration may also double down on efforts to close gaps that have allowed China to maintain access to some cutting-edge chips, especially those involved in AI.
On November 19, media reports stated that President-elect Trump picked his transition co-chair Howard Lutnick to lead the Commerce Department. He is the longtime chairman and CEO of a private investment firm and closely involved in the crypto currency market with a limited profile on AI policy issues. This appointment is consequential for the future of U.S. AI policy, as the Commerce secretary will likely have a significant voice on a repeal (in whole or in part) of the Biden administration’s executive order on AI, as well as what might replace it. Additionally, Commerce hosts a number of agencies and initiatives at the forefront of crafting AI policy and guidance. This includes the U.S. AI Safety Institute, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the program distributing funds through the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Bureau of Industry and Security’s export controls regime.
U.S. AI Safety Institute
The fate of the year-old U.S. AI Safety Institute (AISI) also hangs in the balance. There are concerns that it may be viewed as an inhibitor to innovation and inconsistent with the rest of president-elect Trump’s apparent tech and AI agenda. However, most Republicans are supportive of the AISI. Seen as supporting U.S. leadership in AI, Congress is expected to create a legislative basis for the AISI. Efforts are already underway in both the Senate and the House of Representative; both reportedly have bipartisan support.
AI Data Centers
President-elect Trump’s nominee to lead the Environmental Protection Agency, Lee Zeldin, has stated that he would essentially target environmental permitting for data centers and energy infrastructure as part of a strategy to boost American AI. In an interview with Logan Paul, president-elect Trump previously stated that expanding America’s electricity production capacity was crucial to achieve U.S. AI leadership.
DATA FLOWS AND GLOBAL DIGITAL GOVERNANCE
President-elect Trump has made no statements, nor key appointments, that provide insight into how his administration will approach global data governance. The 2025 Presidential Transition Project’s assessment of the Industry and Analysis team at the Department of Commerce states (page 669) that it does “indispensable work ensuring cross-border data flows, particularly with Europe, remain open and relatively unrestricted.” It is the report’s only mention of data flows.
PROTECTING SENSITIVE U.S. DATA
The Biden administration’s Department of Justice proposed a rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans’ Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons, namely, China. It is unclear whether the Trump administration will revoke or revise this executive order.
POSTURE ON COMPETITION ISSUES
Many expect the second Trump administration to ease antitrust enforcement and be more receptive to mergers and deal-making after years of scrutiny under the Biden administration. This is as the chief architects of the latter’s stance – Lina Khan of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department’s Jonathan Kanter – are not expected to be a part of the new administration. However, this anticipated shift is unlikely to prompt regulators to abandon existing antitrust cases against Big Tech firms, partly because those legal showdowns coalesce with civilian concern over the increasing power and influence of the industry.
Gail Slater is reportedly involved in vetting candidates to lead the FTC. She herself is also viewed as a potential candidate for FTC chair, replacing Lina Khan. One of the two Republicans on the Commission, Andrew Ferguson, former chief counsel to Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, or Melissa Holyoak, Utah’s former solicitor general, is expected to become the agency’s acting chair and set priorities for FTC staff while a replacement is confirmed.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION
On November 17, President-elect Trump nominated Brendan Carr to chair the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). Shortly after thanking the president for the appointment, Carr wrote on X, “We must dismantle the censorship cartel and restore free speech rights for everyday Americans.” Carr wrote the chapter on the FCC in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, writing that the FCC’s priorities should be “reining in Big Tech, promoting national security, unleashing economic prosperity, and ensuring FCC accountability and good governance.” He also wrote that TikTok “poses a serious and unacceptable risk to America’s national security” and should be banned. Carr has also supported the rollback of net neutrality rules and called for revoking Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
CHINESE TECH FIRMS – E.G. TIKTOK
Since his election, president-elect Trump has not publicly discussed his plans for TikTok. Recent media reports quote people familiar with his views as saying that he will try to halt a potential U.S. ban of TikTok next year. In March 2024, he cited national security and data privacy concerns over TikTok, but also said “there’s a lot of good and there’s a lot of bad” with the app. During the campaign, he had voiced opposition to banning TikTok during his candidacy and criticized the Biden administration and Vice President Kamala Harris for the ban.
The first Trump administration’s “Clean Network” program best encapsulates its strategy of excluding China and Chinese tech firms and products from telecommunication networks and submarine cables, smart phone apps and app stores, and cloud services. Under this broad goal, the Trump administration (with help from Congress) achieved several wins. It succeeded in getting countries to focus on risks from Chinese telecommunications firms (namely, Huawei and ZTE) in 5G telecommunications networks. The Trump administration reformed Team Telecom, which cut off China’s connections to the U.S. telecommunications network. In 2018, Congress reformed how the U.S. screens foreign investment, which led to a sharp decrease in covered China-related transactions. However, the Trump administration tried and failed to ban WeChat and TikTok.
It is unclear what approach or strategy a second Trump administration may take towards other Chinese tech firms and services. Senator Marco Rubio’s proposed appointment as Secretary of State points towards a similarly hawkish approach to targeting Chinese technology companies and products.
